

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 178820
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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: FRG PAPER

FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN DELIVERED FOLLOWING PAPER TO ACDA
DIRECTOR WARNKE JULY 28. ENGLISH TRANSLATION WAS PROVIDED
BY THE FRG. THE GERMAN TEXT WILL BE POUCHED TO ACTION
ADDRESSEES.

BEGIN TEXT:

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 178820

1. THE WESTERN DATA INITIATIVE HAVING BEEN INTRODUCED ON
15 JULY, IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT, AFTER THE WARSAW PACT HAS
EXAMINED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, THE DISCUSSION ON DATA WILL
BE INTENSIFIED WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE RESUMED AT THE END
OF SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER
THE EASTERN SIDE WILL TAKE UP THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND WHAT
THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION WILL BE.

2. THE DATA DISCUSSION AND THE ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT
ON THE DATA BASE WILL BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE

FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE DATA BASE WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IN ADDITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SALT II FUTURE WESTERN STEPS IN MBFR WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT DATA DISCUSSION.

3. AGREEMENT ON THE DATA BASE PRESUPPOSES THE CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT DATA DISCUSSION. THIS WOULD MEAN THE WARSAW PACT IS WILLING TO DISCLOSE ITS DATA PROGRESSIVELY AND IN DETAIL AND COME TO THE CONVICTION THAT THE WEST WILL NOT BE BROUGHT TO ABANDON ITS POSITION ON THE EXISTING DISPARITY. ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP WILL BE THE READINESS OF THE EAST TO REVISE THE BASIC COUNTING CRITERIA AND METHODS.

4. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE CURRENT DATA DISCUSSION WILL NOT YET LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON DATA. SUCH AGREEMENT WILL PROBABLY NECESSITATE A POLITICAL DECISION BY THE EAST TO REVISE THE DATA IT HAS SUBMITTED. ANY FUTURE WESTERN INITIATIVES SHOULD BE MADE ONLY ON CONDITION THAT AGREEMENT ON DATA WILL BE REACHED. THE WEST MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT CONCRETE STEPS REGARDING MBFR WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA WILL HAVE CONFIRMED THE EXISTING DISPARITIES AND CREATED THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING GENUINE PARITY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 178820

PROPOSAL

5. WE PROPOSE TO EXAMINE IN NATO POTENTIAL NATO INITIATIVES-TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PROGRESS IN SALT II AND THE EASTERN REACTION TO THE LATEST WESTERN DATA-PROPOSAL-WHICH COULD ENVISAGE:

A. EITHER PROPOSING--AFTER--REACHING AGREEMENT ON DATA CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS IN THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION

B. OR-SHOULD THE DATA DISCUSSION STAGNATE-TO BRING ABOUT A DATA AGREEMENT BY INDICATING TO THE OTHER SIDE WHICH MODIFICATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER AND ON CONDITION THAT A DATA AGREEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED.

6. WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOP THE WESTERN MBFR POSITION THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS ARE SUGGESTED FOR EXAMINATION WITHIN NATO:

A. A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL BASED ON NATO'S PRESENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL BUT MODIFYING IT IN PARTS,

B. A PROPOSAL FOR A STRUCTURED INTERIM RESULT WHICH COULD TAKE THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL RETAINING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION BUT LEAVING IT TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS TO COMPLETE THE PROTOCOL ARRANGEMENTS.

7. THE ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED ARE BOTH BASED ON THE

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATO POSITION. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO ENABLE THE ALLIANCE AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AT MBFR.

8. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS WITH THE EAST POSSIBLE PRACTICABLE SOLUTIONS TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS. IT SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE AVOIDED THAT INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS ARE SETTLED IN ISOLATION WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY CLARITY
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 178820

ABOUT THE CONCRETE SUBSTANCE TO BE GIVEN TO THEM AND ABOUT THE SOLUTION OF CARDINAL PROBLEMS.

SUBSTANCE OF THE MODIFIED WESTERN NEGOTIATING PACKAGE.

9. AGREEMENT ON PARITY IN GROUND FORCES NUMERICALLY DEFINED AS OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (ILLUSTRATION: MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING OF 700,000 MEN).

10. AGREEMENT ON ACHIEVING THIS AIM BY REDUCING THE MANPOWER "OVERHANG" IN EXCESS OF THE AGREED PARITY FIGURES.

THE FOLLOWING VARIANT ARE POSSIBLE:

A. AGREEMENT ON SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I AS ENVISAGED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND AGREEMENT TO REDUCE THE OVERHANG ON BOTH SIDES BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES. THE NON-US AND NON-SOVIET PARTICIPANTS COULD GIVE THE ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL COLLECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AGREED DATA BASE AND THE NUMERICALLY DEFINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING BY REDUCING THEIR FORCES ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS.

B. AGREEMENT ON ALL STEPS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE NEGOTIATING AIM OF PARITY.

1ST PHASE:

REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US MANPOWER AS ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE WEST (29,000 US, 68,000 SOVIET MEN).

2ND PHASE:

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 178820

REDUCTION OF THE REMAINING "OVERHANG" BY A GIVEN PERCENTAGE (E.G. 40) IN THE FORM OF COLLECTIVE REDUCTIONS OF THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF ALL MEN, NON-US AND NON-SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

3RD PHASE:

FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF THE REMAINING "OVERHANG" BY A GIVEN PERCENTAGE (E.G. 60) AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PARITY THROUGH COLLECTIVE REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. ADDITIONAL SOVIET AND US QUOTAS COULD CORRESPOND TO THEIR QUOTAS IN THE TOTAL FORCES.

(NOTE: IF THE DISPARITY ESTABLISHED BY THE WEST IS APPLIED, SOVIET AND US PHASE 1-REDUCTIONS COULD ALSO BE EXPRESSED IN A PERCENTAGE OF THE "OVERHANG.")

THE RESULT OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS WILL BE MANPOWER PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WITH SOVIET AND US SUBCEILINGS AT THE POST-PHASE 1 LEVEL. THIS REDUCTION SCHEME DETERMINES COLLECTIVE NON-SOVIET AND NON-US REDUCTIONS BY A GIVEN PERCENTAGE. IT THUS PROVIDES A POSSIBILITY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF ASSURING PARTICIPATION OF NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN REDUCTIONS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE BASIS OF COLLECTIVITY.

11. CLARIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY:

-AS A RESULT OF SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS IN THE 1ST PHASE NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR SOVIET AND US FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST AFTER THE SUBSEQUENT PHASES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

-REDUCTIONS IN THE 2ND PHASE WOULD CONCERN NON-SOVIET AND NON-US FORCES ONLY.

-REDUCTIONS IN THE 3RD PHASE WILL BE OF A COLLECTIVE NATURE
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 178820

ALSO FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES PARTICIPATING THEREIN IN PROPORTION TO THEIR STRENGTH RELATIVE TO THE TOTAL MANPOWER LEVEL ON BOTH SIDES.

-THE RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR BOTH SIDES. SOVIET AND US NATIONAL CEILINGS ESTABLISHED IN PHASE 1 WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

12. AGREEMENT ON THE TIME REQUIREMENT BETWEEN THE PHASES. IN ADDITION, NATO COULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF ENTERING INTO AN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE TIME REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING.

13. MODIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY.

WHILE ADHERING TO THE WESTERN PRINCIPLES OF CONCENTRATION ON MANPOWER AND OF SELECTIVITY IN ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, THE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A COMPLETE SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH 68,000 MEN, 1,700 TANKS AS WELL AS ALL OTHER ARMAMENTS AND

EQUIPMENT COULD BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

-WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 TANKS
INCLUDING 5 SOVIET DIVISIONS,

-WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1,700 TANKS THE OTHER ARMAMENT OF
THESE DIVISIONS COULD REMAIN IN THE AREA AND WOULD NOT BE
LIMITED. - -

THE NUCLEAR OFFER OF THE WEST WOULD NOT BE CHANGED.

IN THIS CONNECTION THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN NATO
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE MODIFIED STRATEGIC SITUATION
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 178820

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF MBFR (NUCLEAR STRATEGIC PARITY,
SOVIET AIR TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES, SOVIET EURO-STRATEGIC
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, INCREASED SOVIET OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY
(TANKS):

A. HOW CAN ANY FURTHER CONCENTRATION OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE
TANKS IN THE REDUCTION AREA BE PREVENTED?

B. HOW CAN THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS BE
REDUCED MORE THAN PRESENTLY ENVISAGED?

14. MODIFICATION OF REDUCTION MODALITIES: THE US GOVERN-
MENT HAS LET US KNOW THAT IT CONSIDERS THE POSSIBILITY OF
REDUCTION OF US UNITS ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS AND WITHOUT A
CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT. THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATION OF THE
WESTERN POSITION (NO REDUCTION BY UNITS, ONLY A THINNING OUT
OF MANPOWER) WOULD BE CONCEIVABLE: THE GREATER PART OF THE
US FORCES (NOT, HOWEVER, THE NON-AMERICAN FORCES) MIGHT BE
REDUCED BY UNITS. A LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF UNITS WILL
BE AVOIDED. THE OTHER FORCES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE
AS TO THE MODALITIES OF THEIR REDUCTIONS.

(NOTE: THIS MODIFICATION SHOULD BE SUGGESTED IN NATO ONLY
AS A US INITIATIVE.)

15. MAINTENANCE OF WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR AGREEMENT ON
STABILIZING MEASURES:

WE PROPOSE THAT NATO SHOULD EXAMINE WHETHER AND TO WHAT
EXTENT ADDITIONAL STABILIZING MEASURES COULD BE BROUGHT UP
FOR DISCUSSION IN THE VIENNA TALKS. THESE MEASURES SHOULD
HELP TO MAKE A SHORT-TERM INCREASE IN FORCES IN THE REDUC-
TION AREA MORE DIFFICULT IN ORDER TO GAIN WARNING TIME.

16. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE IN MANPOWER
AFTER CONCLUSION OF A PHASE 1 AGREEMENT AND FOR THE DURATION
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 178820

OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED.

17. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WILL BE MAINTAINED.

CONTENTS OF A STRUCTURED INTERIM RESULT IN THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL.

A PROTOCOL COULD BE ADOPTED BY THE NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA BY WAY OF CONSENSUS. IT COULD BE SIMILAR IN FORM TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS ADOPTED ON 14 MAY 1973 IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE, AND ITS CONTENTS COULD BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

18. AGREEMENT ON THE OVERALL DATA BASE AND ON THE DATA BASE FOR SOVIET AND US GROUND PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

19. AGREEMENT ON THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING PARITY AT THE LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN ON BOTH SIDES.

20. AGREEMENT ON THE PHASED APPROACH.

21. AGREEMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON MANPOWER AND ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SELECTIVITY FOR WEAPONS AND MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY REDUCTION OF THE DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

22. AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SOVIET AND US FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE. ASSURANCE TO BE GIVEN BY NON-US AND NON-SOVIET PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE PART COLLECTIVELY IN THE REDUCTIONS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH PARITY IN LATER PHASES.

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 178820

23. DECLARATION OF INTENT TO ESTABLISH THE LEVEL OF PARITY AGREED BY REDUCING THE "OVERHANG" IN EQUAL PERCENTAGE STEPS.

24. ADOPTION FOR MBFR OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT IN BINDING FORM AND READINESS TO PROVIDE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

25. DECLARATION OF INTENT BY BOTH SIDES TO ORIENT CHANGES IN THEIR MANPOWER LEVELS DURING NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY (I.E. NOT TOWARDS THE FINAL FIGURE ENVISAGED, BECAUSE THAT COULD LEAD TO A FREEZE ON THE BASIS OF DISPARITY. THE WEST MUST, BEFORE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, REMAIN FREE TO ESTABLISH, IF NEED BE, PARITY

BY MEANS OF INCREASES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. OTHERWISE,
THE INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO COME TO A CONCLUSION
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE LOST).

26. DECLARATION OF INTENT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH A VIEW OF TAKING THE STEPS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL. END TEXT. VANCE

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